In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (''over-achiever'') versus the least healthy (''under-achiever'') banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers' loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.
Introduction
In the wake of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, the US Congress quickly passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 to ''restore the liquidity and stability to the financial system.'' The Act authorized the Treasury Department to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and to spend up to $700 billion to ''bailout'' the US financial system. As part of the TARP program, the Treasury launched the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) on October 14, 2008. The goal of the Capital Purchase Program was to strengthen the capital base of economically sound banks by designing ''attractive terms to encourage participation by healthy banks.'' The CPP was not intended to be awarded to banks that were economically unviable in the long term. Rather, the Treasury intended to use CPP funds to help temporarily unhealthy banks out of a period of financial distress and to inject capital into healthy banks as a way to stimulate lending and restore credit flowing in the economy.
The Treasury initially committed over a third of the total TARP funding, $250 billion, to the CPP. The first $125 billion was to be invested in nine large, systemically important bank holding companies. The remaining $125 billion was to be made available for other banks. Further, on May 13, 2009, Secretary Geithner announced that the Treasury planned to reopen the application window for participation in the CPP to banks with total assets under $500 million. At the close of the program, the Treasury had invested approximately $205 billion.
While several papers look at the performance of banks that participated in the TARP program, no paper has examined how the pre-crisis health of banks and bank size are related to TARP program participation. Given the dual purpose of the TARP program (to help temporarily unhealthy banks out of a period of financial distress and to inject capital into healthy banks as a way to stimulate lending and restore credit flowing in the economy) and the targeting of a portion of TARP funds to small banks, it is reasonable to expect that the probability of receiving these funds would differ for healthy versus unhealthy and/or large versus small banks. For example, unhealthy banks might be going through a period of temporary weakness in income generation due to delinquent payments on loans. In contrast healthy banks' loans might be performing well. Yet these banks see a loss of liquidity (e.g., from a drawdown of loan commitments), which hurts their abilities to continue this lending.
In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving, repaying (we refer to these as ''repayment banks''), or missing a dividend payment on (we call these ''deadbeat banks'') TARP funds conditional on the bank being a relatively healthy (we assign the term ''over-achiever'') versus a relatively unhealthy (''under-achiever'') bank at the beginning of the financial crisis. Further, as mentioned above, over half of the funds available for the CPP went to larger banks, while the smallest banks (with total assets less than $500 million) were allowed to apply for TARP funds in two separate rounds. Given these factors, we isolate the impact that bank size has on the probability of over-achiever and under-achiever banks receiving, repaying, or missing a payment on TARP funds. Finally, we identify financial characteristics that affect the timing with which large and small over-achiever and under-achiever TARP banks repay and/or miss a required dividend payment on their TARP funds.
We find that accounting and financial performance ratios that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for under-achievers and over-achievers and for small versus large banks.
1 Specifically, income performance ratios are more significant in determining the probability of receiving TARP funds for small, under-achiever banks, while liquidity is more the driving factor for large banks. Consistent with TARP's goal of helping temporarily unhealthy banks get through a period of financial distress, we find that TARP small under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. Large banks experience liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers who see weaknesses in delinquent payments on loans, TARP over-achievers see increases in their return on loans in 2008Q3. Yet liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Thus, TARP injections allow this group to continue this trend of successful lending. We find that repayment banks are more likely to be large banks and those that see performance improvements during the time they hold TARP funds. Over-achiever banks, particularly large banks, which are more likely to repay TARP funds and to repay faster, are those that see larger improvements in loan portfolio quality and expense reduction. Under-achiever repayment banks also see improvements in the loan portfolio quality and increases in deposit growth. Liquidity appears to be an issue at both under and overachiever small and large deadbeat banks. Under-achievers lose core deposits, sell illiquid assets, and use equity cushions as costly sources of liquidity. Over-achiever deadbeats lose liquidity as core deposits are lost and loan commitments are drawn down by customers unable to get funds in public debt markets. Thus, deadbeat TARP banks use (drain) many sources of liquidity to make their TARP payments. But eventually, these efforts fail and even increase the probability of becoming a deadbeat.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps the TARP Capital Purchase Program. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Capital Purchase Program
The TARP is the largest government rescue program in US history in terms of funds appropriated. TARP was established by the US Treasury in October 2008 to shore up the financial system after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy and the near collapse of the entire US financial system. In the original plan presented by then-Secretary of the Treasury Paulson, the government would use TARP funds to buy distressed assets in financial institutions. On October 14, 2008, Mr. Paulson announced a revision in TARP implementation in which the Treasury directly injected up to $250 billion 2 of TARP funds (through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)) into the US banking system through the purchase of senior preferred stock and warrants in qualifying financial institutions (QFIs). 3 The amount of CPP capital that a QFI could apply for was restricted to between 1% and 3% of the QFI's risk-weighted assets. The preferred stock purchased by the Treasury was treated as Tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes. The Treasury was paid a 5% dividend on the preferred stock in the first 5 years and a 9% dividend thereafter. 4 The Treasury intended to use CPP funds to help temporarily unhealthy banks out of a period of financial distress and to inject capital into healthy banks as a way to stimulate lending and restore credit flowing in the economy. Mehran and Thakor (2011) show that an equity infusion lowers the risk of default on debt, lowers financial distress costs, and increases a bank's monitoring incentives. Thus, by lowering the costs of financial distress, an injection of equity through the CPP could lead to an improvement in a bank's financial performance.
In contrast to the situation experienced by temporarily unhealthy banks, many banks remained financially healthy (maintaining positive return on assets and at least the minimum Tier I common equity ratios) during the financial crisis. Most of these banks chose not to apply for CPP funds. Other banks in this group, however, viewed the CPP as a means to raise relatively low cost of capital funds in tight financial markets. The government viewed CPP injections into these banks as a way to stimulate lending in the economy.
To apply for CPP investments, banks were asked to submit their applications to their primary federal regulator: the Fed, FDIC, OCC, or OTS. 5 After reviewing an application, a federal banking regulator sent the application and its recommendation to the Office of Financial Stability at the Treasury Department. Based on recommendations from federal banking regulators, the Treasury made the final decision on whether or not to make the capital purchase. Many institutions decided to apply, while others opted out. Some were asked by federal regulators not to apply. A large number of banks withdrew their applications. However, because the Treasury did not release details of the applicant list to the public, it is not known how many banks withdrew their TARP applications voluntarily despite being qualified and how many withdrew because they did not meet the requirements and were encouraged to withdraw by the banking regulators. 6 All TARP investments were publicly announced within two business days of execution. The application period for publicly-held 1 Jin et al. (2011) examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis to predict banks that subsequently fail during the financial crisis. For the full sample of banks, they identify ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show, CPP capital infusions occurred in stages, with larger banks and those with weaker capital ratios financed first and smaller and better capitalized banks financed later. The Capital Purchase Program is often characterized as a program for ''big banks.'' Indeed, $163.5 billion of all CPP funds were allotted to the largest 19 banks. Further, many believe that small institutions were not able to and did not participate in the program. In fact, because of financial obligations associated with CPP, federal regulators did not initially allow temporarily unhealthy community banks to participate in CPP because such institutions would risk the Treasury's investment. In addition, because S-Corporations can only issue one class of equity, which can be held only by natural persons, the Treasury was unable to purchase preferred shares in QFIs that were S-Corporations (which are small banks). However, on January 14, 2009 the Treasury announced a program for S-Corps to receive CPP funds. Under this program, the Treasury purchased subordinated debentures that were senior to the bank's common stock, but subordinated to any claims of depositors and other debt obligations. Further, on May 13, 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner announced that the Treasury would reopen the application window for participation in the CPP to banks with total assets under $500 million, and to increase the amount that could be invested from 3% of risk-weighted assets to 5% of risk-weighted assets. With fewer than 10% of the qualifying financial institutions participating in CPP, the Treasury stated that ''the original purpose of CPP would be better served if the approval standards are adjusted to increase participation.'' In the end, smaller financial institutions make up the vast majority of participants in the CPP. By the time it closed on December 31, 2009, of the 707 applications approved and funded by the Treasury through the CPP, over half were institutions with less than $500 million in assets.
The CPP was intended to inject equity into financial institutions that were suffering from temporary liquidity and other financial problems due to the financial crisis, but were otherwise in decent shape. But it turns out that several TARP recipient banks were not healthy at all. In the 2 years after TARP was set up, many TARP banks could not make their TARP dividend payments nor could they find new private capital, suggesting that many TARP banks were probably not healthy enough to be rescued in the first place.
As of October 2010, over 145 TARP banks had missed at least one, and in some cases several, dividend payments to the US Treasury and four had failed altogether. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) find that across the three rounds of TARP injections banks with weaker capital ratios received TARP earlier. Round 1 recipients and round 2 recipients had an average Tier 1 capital ratio of 9.6%, and 9.7% respectively, while round 3 recipients had an average Tier 1 ratio of 10.6%. The differences are even greater for tangible common equity ratios, which average 3.6% for round 1 banks and 7.6% for round 3 banks. Thus, while the CPP was touted as a program aimed at strengthening the capital base of economically sound banks during tough economic times, some banks were healthier than others. Indeed, the public and media often characterized capital infusion under the CPP as a government bailout of relatively weaker banks and a waste of taxpayers' money: the terms TARP and CPP became synonyms for ''government bailout. '' As the TARP CPP (hereafter TARP) program progressed, many, particularly healthy, banks realized that the costs of participating in TARP were higher than had been expected. As public outrage swelled over the rapidly growing cost of 'bailing out' financial institutions, the Obama administration and lawmakers attached more and more restrictions on banks that received TARP funds. For example, with the acceptance of TARP funds, banks were told to put off evictions and modify mortgages for distressed homeowners, let shareholders vote on executive pay packages, slash dividends, and withdraw job offers to foreign citizens. Some bankers stated that conditions of the TARP program had become so onerous that they wanted to return the bailout money as soon as regulators set up a process to accept the repayments. For example, just 3 months after receiving TARP funds, Signature Bank of New York announced that because of new executive pay restrictions assessed as a part of the acceptance of TARP funds, it notified the Treasury that it intended to return the $120 million it had received. Wilson and Wu (2012) look at factors that were associated with a bank's early exit from TARP. Executive pay restrictions were often a rationale cited for early TARP exit, and high levels of CEO pay were associated with banks being significantly more likely to ''escape'' TARP. As a result, many banks, particularly those that were sufficiently healthy, repaid their TARP funds quickly.
A number of papers have analyzed the TARP Capital Purchase Program. Taliaferro (2009) documents that banks with high commitments and opportunities for new lending and banks with exposures to certain troubled loan classes tended to participate in the program. Without new capital, these banks' capital ratios would fall as they made new loans or as the value of their loans collapsed. 9 To avoid falling below a target capital structure, these banks needed to raise new equity. 10 Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that after the failure of Lehman Brothers there was a run by shortterm bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short-term debt. They document that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in business loans reported on bank balance sheets. They show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and that banks that were more vulnerable to credit line drawdowns reduced their lending to a greater extent. 7 These banks held over half of the banking industry's assets. 8 The exact number of applications is not disclosed. The Fact Sheet on the Treasury's website states, ''the number of applications under review at the regulators is in the thousands, representing every state in the country.'' 9 Popov and Ongena (2011) find that rapid pre-crisis interbank market integration led to firm overleveraging, which contributed to the firms' woes during the crisis. The rapid convergence of interbank rates resulted in a rapid decrease in rates on loans to business firms. Firms were tempted into excess bank debt by rapidly falling rates on business loans. As the financial crisis hit, these firms were unable to maintain payments on this excess debt. 10 Black and Hazelwood (2012) consider the effect of TARP capital injections on bank risk-taking by analyzing the risk ratings of banks' commercial loan originations during the crisis. The results indicate that, relative to non-TARP banks, the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks, but decreased at small TARP banks. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) show that strong political connections increased the probability that a bank received a capital infusion under TARP. Li (2012) shows that, although politics played a role in TARP funds distribution to banks, TARP investments still managed to promote bank lending. In this sense, TARP successfully fulfilled its goal of pumping credit into the economy. Cadman et al. (2012) find that firms with a greater likelihood of being impacted by the pay restrictions were less likely to accept TARP funds. Wilson and Wu (2010) look at characteristics of banks that exit TARP early and Wilson (forthcoming-b) looks at banks that miss a TARP dividend payment. Bebchuk and Goldstein (2008) , Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) , Taliaferro (2009) , Philippon and Schnabl (forthcoming) , Wilson (forthcoming-a) , and Wilson and Wu (2010) look at the likely impact of TARP investments on bank lending. Ng et al. (2011) look at publicly traded TARP banks. They find that these TARP banks experienced significantly lower equity returns relative to non-TARP banks during TARP's initiation period. They also find that equity markets adjusted the values of the TARP banks upward in the quarters following TARP injections. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) also provide an analysis of the valuation effects of TARP, but for just the initial financial institutions that received TARP infusions on October 14, 2008. They find that, while the primary effect of TARP was to benefit bondholders, the program created little value for shareholders. While they find that valuation benefits for banks exceeded the costs imposed on taxpayers, they argue that other potential rescue strategies would have yielded larger net benefits. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) study publicly traded TARP banks. They show that the passage of Congressional Bill H.R. 1586 (that imposed punitive taxes on bonuses at TARP recipients) lowered the value of affected banks, but benefitted non-TARP banks. CEOs earning high excess compensation were more likely to exit TARP and banks repaying TARP funds experienced positive announcement returns. More generally, Aebi et al. (2012) find that banks, in which the chief risk officer directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibited significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables were mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks' performance during the crisis. Jordan et al. (2011) show that publicly traded banks that took TARP funds had lower market-price to book-value ratios than banks that did not take funds. In addition, they find that lower relative costs, higher non-interest income in relation to interest income, lower assets in a non-accrual status, lower owned real estate as a percentage of total assets, and higher interest income to total assets ratios explain the banks' market-price to book-value ratios with high statistical significance. Finally, Wilson (2009 Wilson ( ,2012 look at warrants that were issued as part of the CPP. They examine negotiations and valuation issues, respectively.
While several of the papers noted above look at the performance of banks that participated in the TARP program, no paper has examined how the overall pre-crisis health of banks and bank size are related to TARP program participation. Given the differences surrounding the awarding of TARP funds to financially healthy versus unhealthy banks (to help temporarily unhealthy banks out of a period of financial distress and to inject capital into healthy banks as a way to stimulate lending and restore credit flowing in the economy), as well as the differences in bank size, it is reasonable to expect that the probability of receiving, repaying, or missing a payment on these funds would differ for healthy versus unhealthy and/or large versus small banks. Accordingly, we look at financial characteristics that affect the probability that a bank receives, first repays, and first misses a dividend payment on TARP funds and the time to first repayment of TARP funds and first missed TARP dividend payment conditional on the bank being a relatively healthy (''over-achiever'') versus an unhealthy (''under-achiever'') bank and conditional on bank size at the beginning of the financial crisis. We expect to find differences in the financial characteristics of TARP under-achievers and overachievers. Specifically, we expect TARP under-achievers will be those banks that are doing relatively well as under-achievers. TARP funds are awarded to assist these temporarily unhealthy banks out of a period of financial distress. Further, we expect TARP overachievers will be those healthy banks looking for a cheap source of funding. Finally, we expect that TARP over-achievers will be more likely to repay TARP funds and do so faster, while TARP under-achievers will be more likely to miss and will more quickly miss TARP dividend payments. Table 1 lists the number of TARP banks by asset size class.
As of the end of 2011Q1, 127 of the sample banks had repaid $181 billion of their TARP funds. The average time to the first repayment date is 440 days after the initial injection of TARP funds. We refer to these as ''repayment banks'' throughout the analysis. Another 147 TARP banks (with a total of $3.7 billion in government loans outstanding) had missed at least one scheduled quarterly The sample of TARP banks is compiled using the website of the US Treasury (www.treasury.gov). TARP events data are obtained from Treasury's website and, for deadbeat banks, from Wilson (forthcoming-b) . 11 We include only commercial banks in the analysis. We do not examine thrifts, mortgage firms, or auto companies that received TARP funds. Forty-eight of the banks are S-Corp banks. 12 Thus, we will mean bank holding company whenever we refer to bank or bank holding company.
dividend payment to the government. 13 The average time to the first missed payment is 361 days after the initial TARP injection. We refer to these as ''deadbeat banks.'' Table 1 lists the number of repayment and deadbeat banks analyzed by asset size class.
Bank financial ratios
We use accounting-based measures of bank performance to identify characteristics that are related to the probability of a bank receiving, repaying, or missing a dividend payment on TARP funds and the timing of the repayment of these funds or a missed scheduled dividend payment on the funds. The financial ratios used here are similar to those used in Cornett et al. (2006 Cornett et al. ( ,2011 .
14 Specifically, we evaluate thirteen common bank performance ratios. Return on assets measures the banks' overall performance. Tier I common equity ratio measures the banks' capital adequacy. It was the Tier I common equity ratio that was used by regulators to determine whether a bank was strong enough to repay TARP funds. 15 Real estate loans to total loans, return on loans, loan loss provision to total assets, and nonperforming loans to total assets measure the banks' loan composition and performance. Noninterest expense to total assets measures the banks' operating efficiency. Noninterest income to total assets measures the banks' generation of income from other than lending activities. Derivative securities to total assets measures banks' off-balance-sheet activities. Liquid assets to total assets, illiquid assets to total assets, and unused loan commitments to total loan commitments plus total assets measure banks' (current and contingent) cash position. Finally, core deposits to total assets measure the fraction of the banks' balance sheet financed with more stable deposits. We use calendar quarter-end values from Call Reports to calculate financial ratios for the sample banks before, during, and after the financial crisis. 16 The ratios are listed and defined in Table 2 and summary statistics for TARP banks as of 2008Q3 are reported in Table 3 . Panel A of Table 3 reports information on the sample banks' balance sheet characteristics as of the end of 2008Q3 and Panel B reports performance ratios for the period 2008Q3 (annualized).
As the financial crisis started, the mean (median) ROA for the TARP banks is -0.09% (0.43%). Smaller banks experience the lowest quarterly ROAs: the mean (median) for TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million is À0.15% (0.32%) and for banks with total assets between $500 million and $1 billion is À0.28% (0.53%). Larger banks' mean and median ROAs are 0.26% (0.37%). As is typical, small banks hold more real estate loans in their loan portfolios than large banks: the mean (median) is 71.78% (75.70%) for TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million and 55.19% (59.16%) for banks with total assets greater than $10 billion. With delinquent and defaulting real estate loans being the impetus of the financial crisis, these larger holdings at small banks exposes them to greater default, and ultimately, insolvency risk. Further, as is typical, large banks hold more derivative securities off their balance sheets than small banks: the mean (median) is 0.33% (0.00%) for TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million and 272.79% (26.65%) for banks with total assets greater than $10 billion. 17 Finally, note that unused loan commitments to total loan commitments plus total assets increase with bank size: the mean (median) for TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million is 11.94% (11.42%) and for banks with total assets greater than $10 billion is 24.92% (21.07%). During the financial crisis banks managed shocks to loan demand stemming from preexisting unused loan commitments (held off balance sheet). Unused commitments expose banks to liquidity risk, which became manifest when takedown demand increased following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. To offset these risks, banks can hold more equity, hold more liquid assets, and/or finance assets with more stable (core) deposits. As reported in Table 3 , as the financial crisis hit, TARP banks, on average, are well capitalized; the mean (median) Tier I common equity ratio is 12.39% (11.42%). Smaller banks hold high levels of Table 2 Definition of financial ratios used to analyze bank performance.
(1) Return on assets Net income after taxes as a percent of total assets (2) Tier I common equity ratio Tier I common equity as a percent of total assets (3) Loan loss provision to loans Loan loss provision expense as a percent of total loans and leases (4) Nonperforming loans to total loans Total loans and leases more than 90 days past due plus nonaccruing loans and leases plus other real estate owned as a percent of total loans and leases (5) Noninterest expenses to total assets Noninterest expenses as a percent of total assets (6) Noninterest income to total assets Noninterest income as a percent of total assets (7) Return on loans Interest and fees on loans to total loans and leases (8) Real estate loans to total loans Real estate loans as a percent of total loans (9) Derivatives to total assets Notional amount of derivatives outstanding as a percent of total assets (10) Liquidity ratio Cash and book value of total investment securities as a percent of total assets (11) Illiquid assets to total assets Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowances + MBS and ABS held-to-maturity securities + MBS and ABS available-for-sale securities as a percent of total assets (12) Core deposits to total assets Transactions deposits plus non-transaction deposits under $100,000 as a percent of total assets (13) Deposit growth rate Change in core deposits as a percent of core deposits in the previous year (14) Unused loan commitments to total loan commitments plus total assets
Unused loan commitments at as a percent of total loan commitments plus total assets
This Cornett et al. (2006) look at merger-related operating performance at commercial banks. Cornett et al. (2011) look at the performance of banks before and during the financial crisis, focusing on liquidity risk management and credit supply. 15 Alternatively, we examined Tier I capital ratio as a measure of bank capital.
Results and conclusions using this variable are similar and are available from the authors on request. 16 Cornett et al. (2011) examine operational causes for trends in accounting-based performance. They find that liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of [2008] [2009] ; that banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing -stable sources of financing -continued to lend relative to other banks; that banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending; and that off-balance-sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased take down demand displaced lending capacity. They conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.
17 Stiroh and Rumble (2006) examine potential diversification benefits as one reason why US financial holding companies are offering a growing range of financial services. They examine whether the observed shift toward activities that generate fees, trading revenue, and other noninterest income has improved the performance of US financial holding companies (FHCs) from 1997 to 2002. They find that marginal increases in revenue diversification are not associated with better performance, while marginal increases in noninterest income are still associated with lower risk-adjusted profits. Similarly, Lepetit et al. (2008) (using a set of European banks for the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] show that banks expanding into non-interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks which mainly supply loans.
Tier I common equity: the mean (median) for TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million is 12.83% (11.47%). The largest banks, with total assets greater than $3 billion hold high levels as well, 13.13% (12.83%) and 12.25% (11.85%), respectively. Note also that these capital ratio numbers are well above the minimum required Tier I common equity ratio needed for ''adequately'' capitalized banks (which is 4%). Further, only 1 of the sample 640 TARP banks had a Tier I common equity ratio of less than 4%. Thus, as the financial crisis began, it appears that the vast majority of TARP banks are adequately capitalized based on Tier I common equity ratios. Further, the mean (median) liquidity ratio for the TARP banks is 17.19% (15.84%). Small banks hold fewer liquid assets than large banks: the mean (median) for banks with total assets less than $500 million is 16.83% (15.40%) and for banks with total assets greater than $10 billion is 20.39% (17.77%). Conversely, the mean (median) illiquidity ratio for the TARP banks is 80.63% (82.07%). Small banks hold more illiquid assets than large banks: 80.13% (81.69%) for TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million, 83.08% (83.51%) for banks with total assets between $500 million and $1 billion, and 73.86% (80.02%) for banks with total assets greater than $10 billion. Finally, the mean (median) ratio of core deposits to total assets for the TARP banks is 60.44% (61.10%). As is typical, small banks finance their assets with more core deposits than large banks: 61.48% (62.52%) for banks with total assets less than $500 million and 49.54% (51.82%) for banks with total assets greater than $10 billion. As discussed above, reasons for receiving TARP funds and the ability to repay these funds may differ for healthy versus unhealthy banks. Thus, to examine whether the health of a bank at the start of the financial crisis affects the way financial characteristics are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds, repaying them, and/or missing a dividend payment on them, we segregate TARP and non-TARP banks based on their return on assets (ROAs). Specifically, we define ''over-achievers'' as those TARP and non-TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA greater than the median for the bank's size group and ''under-achievers'' as those banks with 2008Q3 ROA less than the median for the bank's size group. 18 As reported in Table 3 , the median ROA is 0.32% for TARP banks with 2008Q3 total assets less than $500 million, 0.53% for banks with assets between $500 million and $1 billion, 0.58% for between $1 billion and $3 billion, 0.68% between $3 billion and $10 billion, and 0.37% for banks with assets greater than $10 billion. Note that we use ROA as our measure of health rather than capital. Bank capital results from cumulative earnings and stock sales over the long-term. Thus, bank capital is a consequence of bank performance over many years and is not representative of how the bank is doing going into the financial crisis. ROA is a measure of bank performance over the latest accounting period (in our case 2008Q3). Thus, ROA is a more accurate measure of a bank's health at the start of the crisis.
Methodology
To investigate factors that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds, we estimate probit models. First, we examine financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds:
where X = (Overachiever X B X DB X size ) 0 consists of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is classified as an ''over-achiever'' and 0 otherwise (Overachiever), bank characteristics vector X B contains the fourteen financial ratios (e.g., ROA, Tier 1 common equity ratio) as of the end of the third quarter 2008 (as the financial crisis hit), bank characteristics vector X DB contains changes in these financial ratios for the period from the end of the Overachiever from the regression). Given that the reasons for receiving TARP funds may differ for healthy versus unhealthy banks, this cut of the sample allows us to evaluate how the overall health of a bank at the start of the financial crisis affects the relation between financial performance ratios and the probability of receiving TARP funds. We then analyze banks in separate regressions by size group, e.g., total assets less than $500 million, (omitting b 0 size X size from the regression). This cut of the sample allows us to evaluate how bank size affects the relation between financial ratios and the probability of receiving TARP funds. Finally, we analyze over-achiever and under-achiever banks by size group (total assets less than $500 million and total assets greater than $500 million) in separate regressions. Because of the small sample size, probit models for the each of the five size groups are not reliable. Thus, the final set of probit model regressions analyze banks with total assets of $500 million or above in one regression (with the inclusion of the over-achiever and size group dummy variables).
To investigate factors that are related to the timing of the first repayment of or first missed scheduled dividend payment on TARP funds, we estimate probit and hazard models. We first run probit regressions similar to equation 1 to examine the probability that a bank makes an initial repayment on its TARP funds. In these regressions, we include changes in the financial performance ratios between 2009Q1 and 2010Q1. 19 Results and conclusions using these variables are similar and are available from the authors on request.
19 Probit regressions do not allow us to include a unique value for changes in financial ratios from the time of the TARP injection until the first payment on these funds. The regressions include all 640 TARP banks and only 127 of these are repayment banks. Thus, the variables cannot be specified for all banks in the sample. Accordingly, the best we can do is to select a common time frame in which to examine all TARP banks. Multiple time frames were tested. Results for other time frames are available from the authors on request. 20 Again, probit regressions do not allow us to include a unique value for changes in financial ratios from the time of the TARP injection until the first missed payment. Of the 640 TARP banks included in the regression, only 147 of these are deadbeat banks. Accordingly, we select a common time frame in which to examine all TARP banks. Multiple time frames were tested and are available from the authors on request.
We also use hazard models to examine the time to the first repayment of TARP funds. We relate time to a TARP bank's first repayment with the levels of the various financial ratios during the quarter in which the bank receives its first TARP injection and with changes in these ratios from the time the bank receives its first injection through the quarter just before the bank makes its first TARP payment. On average, TARP repayment banks make their first payment 440 days after receiving their first TARP injection: small banks make their first payment, on average, 507 days after the first injection and large banks make their first payment, on average, 404 days after the first injection. We also use hazard models to examine the time to the first missed payment of a TARP dividend. Here we relate time to a TARP deadbeat bank's first missed dividend payment with the levels of the various financial ratios during the quarter in which the bank receives its first TARP injection and with changes in these ratios from the time the bank receives its first injection through the quarter just before the bank misses its first TARP payment. On average, TARP deadbeat banks miss their first dividend payment 361 days after receiving their first TARP injection: small banks miss their first payment, on average, 346 days after the first injection and large banks miss their first payment, on average, 382 days after the first injection.
We use a Cox proportional hazard model, which specifies a hazard rate taking the form: h½t; xðtÞ; b ¼ h 0 ðtÞ exp½xðtÞ 0 b ð 2Þ where x(t) is the vector of explanatory variables (whose values can change over time) and b is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The functional form of the baseline hazard rate, h 0 (t), is not specified. At each point of time t, b captures the effect of change in x(t) on the relative risk of failure (first repayment/missed dividend). A negative coefficient means that an increase in the variable decreases the hazard (risk) of a first repayment or missed payment of TARP funds at a given date, or equivalently, increases the expected time to first repayment/missed payment.
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The vector of explanatory variables, x(t), consists of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is classified as an over-achiever and 0 otherwise, the fourteen financial ratios (e.g., ROA, Tier 1 common equity ratio) as of the end of the quarter in which the bank receives its first installment of TARP funds, changes in these financial ratios for the period from the end of the quarter in which the bank receives its first installment of TARP funds to the end of the quarter just before the bank makes its first installment of TARP fund repayment/first misses a dividend payment on TARP funds, and bank size variables (Log(Total assets) and a set of size dummies). In alternative variations of this model, we analyze over-achiever and under-achiever banks in separate regressions (omitting the over-achiever dummy variable from the regression). Finally, we analyze banks in separate regressions by size group, e.g., total assets less than $500 million and greater than $500 million.
Because of the small sample size, hazard model estimates for banks within a size group are not so reliable. For example, the hazard model for the first repayment of TARP funds cannot be identified for over-achievers with total assets less than $500 million. Similarly, the hazard model for the first missed dividend payment cannot be identified for over-achievers with total assets less than $500 million or for banks with total assets greater than $500 million. Thus, hazard model regressions are estimated for the full sample of TARP banks, over-achiever TARP banks, under-achievers TARP banks, TARP banks with total assets less than $500 million, and TARP banks with assets greater than $500 million (including over-achiever and size dummy variables).
Results

Probability of receiving TARP funds
To investigate factors that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds, we estimate probit models. Table 4 reports results for our probit model regression Eq. (1). Regression 1 in the table incorporates all US banks, while regressions 2 through 6 split the sample by total assets of the banks as of the end of 2008Q3. In all tables, Panel A lists coefficients on notable variables (discussed below) and Panel B lists coefficients on the remaining variables. To conserve space, standard errors are reported for only Panel A coefficients. For each regression in Table 4 (as well as all  regressions in Tables 5-9) we report a pseudo R-squared. The pseudo R-squared is McFadden's pseudo R-squared measure, which is defined as 1 À L1/L0, where L1 is the log likelihood of the full model and L0 is the log likelihood of the constant-only model.
From regression 1, we see that many of the characteristics related to the probability of receiving TARP funds fit with the intended purpose of the TARP program: to help temporarily unhealthy banks out of a period of financial distress and to inject capital into healthy banks as a way to stimulate lending and restore credit flowing in the economy. That is, not surprisingly, TARP banks are more likely than non-TARP banks to be the ROA under-achievers in their bank size group as the financial crises started (2008Q3). The coefficient on ''Overachiever'' is À0.361 (significant at 1%). Further, TARP banks are more likely to have low ROAs when the ratio is examined as a continuous This table presents hazard model regressions that examine how bank characteristics affect the time to repayment of TARP funds. The dependent variable is the log of the expected time to the first installment of TARP repayment: ln(time to repayment) = x(t) 0 b Ã + e. At each point of time t, b captures the effect of change in x(t) on the relative risk of failure (first repayment). A negative coefficient means that an increase in the variable decreases the hazard (risk) of a first repayment of TARP funds at a given date, or equivalently, increases the expected time to first repayment. Over-achievers are those TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA greater than the median for the bank's size group and under-achievers are those TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA less than the median for the bank's size group. Level ratios are calculated using data for the end of the quarter in which the bank receives its first installment of TARP funds. Changes in ratios are for the period from the end of the quarter in which the bank receives its first installment of TARP funds to the end of the quarter just before the bank makes its first installment of TARP fund repayment. Definitions for the variables used in this table are presented in Table 2 . Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. variable across all banks: the coefficient on ''return on assets'' is À8.248 (significant at 5%). TARP banks also experience larger increases in the percentage of real estate loans in 2007Q3-2008Q3, and as might be expected, have bigger decreases in return on loans during this period (coefficients = 0.333, significant at 10%, and À6.954, significant at 1%, respectively). However, TARP banks see a larger increase in ROA during the year before the financial crisis hit (2007Q3-2008Q3) than non-TARP banks (coefficient = 10.488, significant at 1%). TARP banks also have fewer nonperforming loans to total loans than non-TARP banks in 2008Q3 (coefficient = À14.514, significant at 1%). However, the increase in nonperforming loans in 2007Q3-2008Q3 is larger for TARP banks than non-TARP banks (coefficient = 5.638, significant at 10%). Finally, affecting ROA, TARP banks have lower noninterest income to total assets in 2008Q3 than non-TARP banks (coefficient = À9.406, significant at 5%).
We also see that, relative to non-TARP banks, TARP banks have liquidity issues as the financial crisis begins. TARP banks are those with lower capital (coefficient = À4.210, significant at 1%), fewer liquid assets (coefficient = À1.040, significant at 1%), and fewer core deposits (coefficient = À0.748, significant at 1%). TARP banks have more unused loan commitments in 2008Q3 (coefficient = 1.478, significant at 1%) and see more drawdowns of commitments in 2007Q3-2008Q3 (coefficient = À2.116, significant at 1%) than non-TARP banks. Finally, larger banks have a higher probability of receiving TARP funds.
Looking at the probit regressions run by bank size, Table 4 shows that most of the results listed above are driven by the small- decreases in noninterest expense to total assets increases the probability of receiving TARP funds. Thus, income performance ratios are more significant in determining the probability of receiving TARP funds for small banks, while liquidity is more the driving factor for large banks.
In Table 5 , we report probit regression results, examining under-achievers and over-achievers separately. For comparison purposes, regression 1 in Table 5 replicates regression 1 in Table 4 and regression 4 in Table 5 replicates regression 2 in Table 4 (for banks with total assets <$500 million). Regression 7 reports results using all banks with total assets greater than $500 million.
22 Table 8 Probit regressions examining banks' probabilities of missing a payment of TARP dividends for the first time: over-achievers versus under-achievers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) This table presents probit regressions that examine how bank characteristics affect the probability that a TARP bank first misses a dividend payment on its TARP funds. The dependent variable is the TARP dummy that equals 1 for banks that missed a TARP dividend payment, and zero otherwise. Over-achievers are those TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA greater than the median for the bank's size group and under-achievers are those TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA less than the median for the bank's size group. Changes in ratios are for the period from 2009Q1 to 2010Q1. Definitions for the variables used in this table are presented in Table 2 . Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 22 Due to the small sample size, we do not have sufficient observations to group the four larger bank groups by size and under-achievers versus over-achievers separately. Thus, the analysis and conclusions are drawn by putting the four largest bank size groups together.
Regressions 2 and 3 in Table 5 report results for all under and all over-achievers, respectively; regressions 5 and 6 report these results using the small banks only; and regressions 8 and 9 report these results using all other banks.
In these regressions we see financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ greatly for under-achievers and over-achievers. Compared to non-TARP under-achievers, TARP under-achievers (both small and large banks) are more likely to have low nonperforming loans to total loans in 2008Q3 (coefficient = À17.809, significant at 1%), yet these increase significantly (for small banks) in the year before the crisis (regression 2 coefficient = 7.724, significant at 5% (regression 5 coefficient = 8.788, significant at 5%)). TARP under-achievers are also more likely to have low noninterest income to total assets in 2008Q3 (coefficient = À51.362, significant at 1%), due to both small banks (regression 5 coefficient = À53.300, significant at 1%) and large (regression 8 coefficient = À48.937, significant at 5%) banks. Small under-achiever TARP banks with high levels of This table presents hazard model regressions that examine how bank characteristics affect the time to the first missed payment of TARP dividends. The dependent variable is the log expected time to the first missed dividend payment on TARP funds: ln(time to missed dividend payment) = x(t) 0 b Ã + e. At each point of time t, b captures the effect of change in x(t) on the relative risk of failure (missed dividend). A negative coefficient means that an increase in the variable decreases the hazard (risk) of a missed payment of TARP funds at a given date, or equivalently, increases the expected time to missed payment. Over-achievers are those TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA greater than the median for the bank's size group and under-achievers are those TARP banks with 2008Q3 ROA less than the median for the bank's size group. Level ratios are calculated using data for the end of the quarter in which the bank received its first installment of TARP funds. Changes in ratios are for the period from the end of the quarter in which the bank received its first installment of TARP funds to the end of the quarter just before the bank first missed its TARP dividend payment. Definitions for the variables used in this table are presented in Table 2 . Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. unused loan commitments in 2008Q3 (regression 2 coefficient = 2.043, significant at 1% (regression 5 coefficient = 3.3.318, significant at 1%)) and high drawdowns on these commitments in 2007Q3-2008Q3 (regression 2 coefficient = À2.177, significant at 5% (regression 5 coefficient = À2.593, significant at 5%)) have a higher probability of receiving TARP funds. Thus, consistent with TARP's goal of helping temporarily unhealthy banks get through a period of financial distress, we see that TARP under-achievers see some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also experience liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments.
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The probability of receiving TARP funds increases for TARP overachievers (both small and large banks) with low return on assets in 2008Q3 (coefficient = À62.621, significant at 1%), yet larger increases in ROA for the full year 2007Q3-2008Q3 (coefficient = 31.188, significant at 1%) . Thus, in the year before the crisis ROAs for TARP banks increase faster than for non-TARP banks. However, in the final quarter of this year, TARP banks experience a larger drop in ROA than non-TARP banks. Further, the probability of receiving TARP funds increases for TARP overachievers with high return on loans in 2008Q3 (coefficient = 12.581, significant at 1%), yet larger decreases in return on loans for the full year 2007Q3-2008Q3 (coefficient = À16.688, significant at 1%). Thus, while the return on all assets falls just before the crisis, the return on the loan portfolio picks up. Compared to non-TARP over-achievers, TARP over-achiever banks also appear to be those banks with liquidity issues as the crisis hits. They have fewer liquid assets and core deposits to total assets in 2008Q3 (coefficients = À1.677 and À1.840, significant at 1%, respectively). Like small under-achiever TARP banks with high drawdowns on loan commitments in 2007Q3-2008Q3, large over-achiever banks with high drawdowns on loan commitments over this period have a higher probability of receiving TARP funds (regression 9 coefficient = À2.116, significant at 1%). Unlike TARP under-achievers who see weaknesses in loan performance, TARP over-achievers see improvements in their return on loans in 2008Q3. Yet the loss of liquidity (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending.
24 Thus, TARP injections allow this group to continue successful lending.
Repayment of TARP funds
As of 2011Q1, the Treasury had received over $152 billion in TARP repayments: 127 of our 640 TARP banks had made at least a first installment on their TARP funds. Banks were allowed to repay TARP funds to the Treasury only after consultation with their appropriate regulator. For example, in late February 2009, the Federal Reserve announced that it would conduct a ''stress test'' of the largest US banks, which would measure the ability of these banks to withstand a protracted economic slump: unemployment rate above 10 percent and home prices dropping another 25 percent. The 19 banks tested had received $163.5 billion of the allotted TARP funds. The stress tests of the Fed emphasized the Tier 1 common equity ratio. Institutions that met target Tier I common equity ratios were allowed to repay TARP funds after satisfying certain requirements, including issuing new common stock. Results of the stress test showed that nine of the 19 banks passed and were eligible to repay TARP funds immediately. The other ten banks were required to raise a total of $75 billion in capital in order to be eligible to repay TARP funds. By November 2009, nine of these banks had raised sufficient capital to meet or exceed the required capital buffers. By June 2009, nine of the 19 banks had exited CPP.
While the Treasury does not have the right to force repayment, purchase agreements include costs to banks as repayment time increases.
25 Indeed, as discussed in Section 2, as the TARP program progressed many banks realized that the costs of participating in TARP were higher than had been expected. We examine banks' first repayments of TARP funds in two ways. We first run probit regressions to examine how changes in financial characteristics of TARP banks from 2009Q1 through 2010Q1 are related to the probability that a TARP bank makes a first repayment of funds. We then use hazard models to examine the time to the first repayment of TARP funds. The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 . Regression 1 in Table 6 includes all TARP banks; regressions 2 and 3 examine under-achievers and over-achievers separately. Regressions 4 through 6 include only banks with total assets under $500 million: all of these banks are analyzed in regression 4, under-achiever small banks in regression 5, and over-achiever small banks in regression 6. Regressions 7 through 9 include only banks with total assets greater than $500 million: all of these banks are in regression 7, underachiever large banks in regression 8, and over-achiever large banks in regression 9. From regression 1 in Table 6 we see, not surprisingly, that overachievers are significantly more likely to be repayment banks (coefficient = 0.450, significant at 1%). However, from regression 7, we see that it is larger banks that drive the results (coefficient = 0.440, significant at 1%). Big banks were under intense public scrutiny as a result of the TARP bailout and lawmakers attached many restrictions on banks that received TARP funds. Further, bankers claimed that TARP restrictions made it impossible for TARP banks to compete for top banking talent. As soon as they were allowed to, big banks paid back the funds. Those big banks that were doing well going into the crisis, were the first that were allowed to get out of TARP. Smaller banks, on the other hand, did not receive the same sort of public scrutiny and thus were not under the same pressure to pay back their TARP funds.
Changes in TARP banks' loan portfolios are also related to the probability of TARP repayment. From regression 1, banks that see a decrease in their nonperforming loans to total loans between 2009Q1 and 2010Q1 have a higher probability of repaying (coefficient = À8.054, significant at 5%), due mainly to large over-achiever banks (coefficient = À17.314, significant at 5%). Similarly, decreases in loan loss provisions to total loans and noninterest expense to total assets are related to an increased probability of repaying TARP funds for large over-achiever banks (regression 9 coefficients = À46.511, significant at 1%, and À68.261, significant at 5%, respectively). Finally, higher core deposit growth is related to an increased probability of repaying TARP funds (coefficient = 0.454, significant at 5%); due mainly to under-achiever banks (coefficient = 0.623, significant at 5%).
These results suggest that repayment banks are more likely to be large banks and those that see performance improvements during the time they hold TARP funds. Over-achievers, particularly large banks, see an improvement in loan portfolio quality and expense reduction and, as a result, have the highest probability of repaying TARP funds. This is consistent with TARP funds being used as a low cost source of funding for healthy banks. Underachievers also see improvements in loan portfolio quality and increases in deposit growth. This is consistent with the goal of TARP; to help healthy banks through a temporary period of financial distress.
Looking at the time to the first repayment of TARP funds, Table  7 reports that the health of a bank going into the crisis has no effect on time to the first payment. The coefficient on ''Overachiever'' is insignificant in all regressions. 26 Rather, banks that repay TARP funds faster are those with higher levels of Tier I common equity as TARP funds are first injected. This result is due mainly to underachiever (coefficient in regression 2 = 24.514, significant at 1%) and small banks (regression 4 coefficient = 30.200, significant at 1%). Interestingly, time to repayment increases for under-achiever and small TARP banks that experience bigger decreases in Tier I common equity after the TARP injection (regression 2 coefficient = 20.334 and regression 4 coefficient = 27.253, respectively, significant at 1%), but increases for over-achiever TARP banks that experience big increases in Tier I common equity after the TARP injection (regression 3 coefficient = À15.324, significant at 10%). Thus, under-achiever and small banks reduce the time to their first TARP repayment as their capital cushions increase. Over-achievers continue to do well, yet delay TARP repayments as capital increases. Not surprisingly, banks that make their first TARP payment quickly have fewer nonperforming loans to total loans as TARP funds are injected (regression 1 coefficient = À32.661, significant at 1%): this is driven by over-achievers and large banks (regressions 3 and 5 coefficients = À75.679 and -106.243, respectively, significant at 1%). Further, for both groups decreases in nonperforming loans to total loans after the TARP injection decreases the time to the first TARP repayment (coefficients = À52.979 and À51.472, respectively). However, banks that make their first TARP payment quickly have more real estate loans to total loans as TARP funds are first injected (regression 1 coefficient = 2.874, significant at 1%). This relation is true for all but the smallest TARP banks. Also with respect to the loan portfolio, under-achiever TARP banks with lower levels of loan loss provisions to total assets when TARP funds are received repay TARP funds quicker (coefficient = À145.287, significant at 1%). Finally, under-achiever TARP banks take longer to repay funds when return on loans increase after the TARP injection (coefficient = À44.971, significant at 1%). In contrast, over-achiever TARP banks repay funds faster when return on loans increase after the TARP injection (coefficient = 73.069, significant at 1%). This is consistent with the objective of TARP. Under-achievers are healthy banks with temporary financial problems. As they recover (capital increases and loan loss provisions decrease), they repay their TARP funds. Over-achievers are more likely to use TARP funds as a cheap source of financing. As capital levels in these banks increase, they are more likely to reinvest this capital in other assets such as loans than use it to pay back their relatively cheap source of funding through TARP.
Liquidity concerns also affect TARP banks' repayment patterns. Over-achiever and large banks repay TARP funds faster when they have high levels of liquid assets to total assets (coefficient in regression 3 = 6.028 and in regression 5 = 4.572, significant at 5%) and core deposits to total assets (coefficient in regression 3 = 4.329, significant at 10%, and in regression 5 = 5.518, significant at 1%) going into the crisis. Further, large banks repay TARP funds faster when levels of unused loan commitments to total loan commitments and total assets are high at the time of TARP injections (coefficient = 8.927, significant at 1%) and increase further after the TARP funds are received (coefficient = 29.953, significant at 1%). High levels of loan commitments and the potential for drawdowns create a need for liquid funds and/or stable deposits. However, if loan commitments are not drawn down, the need lessons and liquid funds can be used in other ways. Thus, these banks, with high levels of loan commitments and lower liquidity needs, repay TARP funds faster. For all bank groups, banks that pay back TARP funds slower see the level of core deposits to total assets increase significantly after the TARP injection (for example, regression 1 coefficient = À10.173 for all banks and coefficient = À14.418 for big banks, significant at 1%). As these stable deposits (a source of funding) increase, banks use the funds for other purposes and wait to repay their relatively cheap TARP funds. Finally, larger banks repay TARP funds faster (coefficient in regression 1 = 0.492, significant at 5%). This is true for both under and over-achievers, but is stronger for the sample of TARP banks that have total assets greater than $500 million (coefficient in regression 5 = 0.787, significant at 1%) than those with total assets less than $500 million (coefficient in regression 4 = 0.683, significant at 10%). As mentioned above, big banks were subject to more scrutiny for accepting TARP funds than small banks. As soon as they were allowed to, this group is more likely to pay back their TARP funds.
Missed dividend payment on TARP funds
At the end of 2011Q1, 2 years after the financial crisis started and TARP was passed, many banks were struggling to pay back their TARP funds and were even failing to keep up with the quarterly dividends to the Treasury that were a requirement for taking the funds. While half of the large banks that received TARP funds had repaid their money, only twelve percent of the small banks had done so. For example, for the quarterly dividend payment due in August 2010, 120 institutions missed payments totaling approximately $45 million. Further, 21 banks had missed four payments, 15 banks had missed five payments, six banks had missed six payments, and one bank had missed seven payments.
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Similar to our analysis of TARP fund repayment, we examine the first missed payment of a TARP dividend in two ways. We first run probit regressions to examine how changes in financial characteristics of TARP banks between 2009Q1 and 2010Q2 are related to the probability that a TARP bank misses a first dividend payment. We then use hazard models to examine the time to the first missed payment of a TARP dividend. The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 . The setup of these tables is identical to that of Tables 6 and 7 . From regression 1 in Table 8 we see, that deadbeat banks are significantly more likely to be underachievers (coefficient = À0.340, significant at 5%). However, this result is driven by large banks only (coefficient = À0.530, significant at 1%). Deadbeat banks also see drains in their liquidity: they see larger decreases in Tier I common equity even after the TARP injection (coefficient = À15.795, significant at 1%), bigger decreases in core deposits to total assets (coefficient = À2.672, significant at 1%), bigger drawdowns of unused loan commitments (coefficient = À6.986, significant at 1%), and bigger decreases in illiquid assets to total assets (coefficient = À4.317, significant at 1%) (suggesting they may be selling illiquid assets at fire-sale prices to obtain liquidity) after they receive TARP funds. Surprisingly, TARP deadbeat banks are more likely to see a drop in nonperforming loans to total loans between 2009Q1 and 2010Q2 (coefficient = À19.583, significant at 1%).
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Regressions 2 through 9 split the TARP banks by health and size. With these delineations of TARP banks, we identify how the relations between financial characteristics and the probability of being 26 We do not have sufficient observations to group the small (large) under-achievers and small (large) over-achievers separately. Thus, the analysis and conclusions are drawn from splits of the sample by just health and size separately. 27 Once a bank misses six dividend payments the Treasury has the right to nominate two members to the board. 28 These results are consistent with Wilson (forthcoming-b) who finds that deadbeat TARP banks have weaker core capital, but inconsistent with Wilson who finds that deadbeat banks see an increase in nonperforming loans. However, Wilson looks at the change financial ratios in the quarter before the missed payment, while we are using the period between 2009Q1 and 2010Q2. a deadbeat bank documented for the full sample of TARP banks is a function of the pre-crisis health and size of the bank. Splitting the sample by bank health, it is just the small under-achievers that see a decrease in nonperforming loans increase the probability of becoming a deadbeat TARP bank (regression 5 coefficient = À25.610, significant at 1%). However, recall from regression 5 in Table 5 , this group has higher levels of nonperforming loans in the year prior to the crisis. Likewise, it is under-achievers (both small and large) for which a decrease in illiquid assets to total assets (regressions 5 and 8 coefficients = À4.383, significant at 1%, and À5.864, respectively, significant at 5%) increases the probability of becoming a deadbeat bank.
For over-achievers, an increase in noninterest expense to total assets is significantly related to the probability of becoming a deadbeat TARP bank (regression 3 coefficient = 101.365, significant at 5%), due to large over-achiever banks (regression 9 coefficient = 238.829, significant at 1%). For both over-achiever and under-achiever banks, a drop in core deposits to total assets (regression 2 coefficient = À2.893, significant at 5% and regression 3 coefficient = À4.506, significant at 10%) and drawdowns of unused loan commitments to total assets (regression 2 coefficient = À6.347 and regression 3 coefficient = À11.306, significant at 5%) increases the probability of becoming a deadbeat bank. Loss of core deposits combined with large drawdowns on loan commitments hurt the liquidity position of banks. For these banks, this loss of liquidity leaves the banks unable to pay their TARP dividends and drives the banks to deadbeat status.
Thus, liquidity appears to be an issue at both under and overachiever small and big deadbeat banks. Under-achievers lose core deposits, sell illiquid assets, and use equity cushions as costly sources of liquidity. Over-achievers lose liquidity as core deposits are lost and as loan commitments are drawn down by customers unable to get funds in public debt markets. As these liquidity drains develop, banks increase the probability of becoming deadbeats.
Looking at the time to the first missed TARP payment, Table 9 reports that the health of a bank going into the crisis has no effect on time to missed payment. The coefficient on ''Overachiever'' is insignificant in all regressions. 29 Rather, banks that miss their first TARP dividend payment quickly have lower levels of Tier I common equity as TARP funds are first injected (coefficient = À16.009, significant at 1%). This result is driven mainly by the under-achiever banks (coefficient in regression 2 = À19.980, significant at 1%). Further, time to missed dividend increases for TARP banks that experience big increases in Tier I common equity after a TARP injection (for example, coefficient = À24.032 for under-achiever banks and À32.839 for big banks, both significant at 1%). Not surprisingly, banks that have less equity more quickly miss dividend payments on their TARP funds and were possibly even encouraged by their regulators to miss a payment. As seen in Table 8 , a decrease in Tier I capital after the TARP injection actually increases the probability of becoming a deadbeat bank. Similarly, banks that most quickly miss their first TARP dividend payment have lower levels of liquid assets to total assets (mainly due to over-achievers (coefficient = À12.804, significant at 1%) and large banks (coefficient = À3.773, significant at 10%)) as TARP funds are first injected. For all bank groups, banks that more quickly miss their first TARP dividend payment see the level of core deposits to total assets fall significantly after the TARP injection (for example, coefficient = À6.478 for all banks and coefficient = À8.280 for big banks, significant at 1%). Further, after the TARP injection, banks, particularly under-achiever banks, that quickly miss a TARP dividend payment reduce their holdings of derivative securities to total assets (coefficient in regression 2 = À12.048). Finally, regardless of health and size, banks that quickly first miss a dividend payment have higher nonperforming loans to total loans as TARP funds are first injected (for example, coefficient = 32.663 for all banks and coefficient = 31.761 for under-achiever banks, significant at 1%) and nonperforming loans to total loans gets even worse, increasing after the TARP injection for under-achiever and small banks (coefficients = 6.955 and 8.642, respectively). Similarly, under-achiever and large banks that quickly first miss a dividend payment have higher loan loss provisions to total loans as TARP funds are first injected (coefficient in regression 2 = 29.893, significant at 1%, and coefficient in regression 5 = 32.091, significant at 5%) and loan loss provisions to total loans gets worse, increasing after the TARP injection for under-achiever and small banks (coefficient in regression 2 = 12.399, significant at 10%, and coefficient in regression 5 = 27.689, significant at 1%). Thus, TARP banks with less capital, less liquidity, and weaker loan portfolios are quickest to become deadbeats.
Conclusions
In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving, repaying, or missing a dividend payment on TARP funds. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for under-achievers and over-achievers. TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers who see weaknesses in delinquent payments on loans, TARP over-achievers see increases in their return on loans in 2008Q3. Yet liquidity issues (from decreases in core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Thus, TARP injections allow this group to continue this trend of successful lending.
Repayment banks are those that see performance improvements during the time they hold TARP funds. Over-achiever banks, particularly large banks, which are more likely to repay TARP funds are those that see larger improvements in loan portfolio quality and expense reduction. Under-achievers also see improvements in the loan portfolio quality and increases in deposit growth. Liquidity appears to be an issue at both under and over-achiever small and big deadbeat banks. Under-achievers lose core deposits, sell illiquid assets, and use equity cushions as costly sources of liquidity. Over-achievers lose liquidity as core deposits are lost and loan commitments are drawn down by customers unable to get funds in public debt markets.
